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Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?

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Listed:
  • Sounman Hong

    (Yonsei University)

  • Jeehun Lim

    (Yonsei University)

Abstract

Does the revolving door phenomenon erode bureaucratic integrity? To answer this question, we undertake a quantitative case study of a private university in South Korea that recruited a former vice minister of education as its president. Specifically, we investigate whether after employing this high-ranking former public official the university received favorable treatment from the education ministry in terms of funding. Estimates from difference-in-difference, triple difference, and synthetic control methods all suggest that the high-profile public official’s recruitment is associated with financial benefits from the official’s former employing agency; no such advantage, however, was observed for benefits from other agencies. This result offers suggestive but compelling evidence that the revolving door distorts the allocation of government resources; the financial benefits the university received are due not to the recruited official’s greater competence, expertise, or knowledge but rather to his implicit collusion with the government.

Suggested Citation

  • Sounman Hong & Jeehun Lim, 2016. "Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 69-86, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:166:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0315-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0315-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2023. "Why do farmers seek office? Regulatory capture in Russian agricultural subsidization," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(2), pages 111-130.
    2. Bong Hwan Kim & Sounman Hong, 2019. "Political change and turnovers: How do political principals consider organizational, individual, and performance information?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 291-308, December.
    3. Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong, 2022. "The Liability of Tribe in Corporate Political Activity: Ethical Implications for Political Contestability," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 623-644, December.
    4. Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Bussolo, Maurizio & de Nicola, Francesca & Panizza, Ugo & Varghese, Richard, 2022. "Politically connected firms and privileged access to credit: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    6. Sounman Hong & Taek Kyu Kim, 2017. "Regulatory capture in agency performance evaluation: industry expertise versus revolving-door lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 167-186, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capture; Revolving door; Corruption; Lobbying; Allocative efficiency; Political connections; Bureaucratic integrity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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