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Hometown identity of financial officials, financial development and promotion of officials in China

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  • Haiyuan Yin
  • Baifan Chen

Abstract

By collecting the hometown information of financial officials, and the data of provincial governors and secretaries of the provincial Communist Party of China (CPC) in China from 2001 to 2017, we have proved the causality relationship among financial officials' hometown identity, financial development and the promotion of local officials. Empirical results show that financial officials' hometown identity significantly increases the promotion probability of provincial governors and secretaries of the provincial CPC committee. We also confirmed the positive relationship between financial officials' hometown identity and financial development. This may be because financial officials prefer their hometown when allocating financial resources. It is further found that financial development plays an intermediary role between the financial officials' hometown identity and local officials' promotion.

Suggested Citation

  • Haiyuan Yin & Baifan Chen, 2021. "Hometown identity of financial officials, financial development and promotion of officials in China," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 520-543, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:60:y:2021:i:3:p:520-543
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8454.12217
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