Arm's Length Relationships

Citations

Cited by:

1. Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
2. Zhang, Min & M, Lijun & Zhang, Bo & Yi, Zhihong, 2016. "Pyramidal structure, political intervention and firms' tax burden: Evidence from China's local SOEs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 15-25.
3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
4. Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, 2015. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1383-1414.
   • Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, 2011. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," FMG Discussion Papers dp694, Financial Markets Group.
   • Burkart, Mike & Raff, Konrad, 2015. "Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69539, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   • Burkart, Mike & Raff, Konrad, 2012. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Burkart, Mike & Raff, Konrad, 2011. "Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119058, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
5. Cremer, Jacques, 1995. "Towards an economic theory of incentives in just-in-time manufacturing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 432-439, April.
6. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
7. Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2015. "Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 294-338, November.
   • Piero Gottardi & Ronel Elul, 2007. "Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must we Also Forget?," Working Papers 2007_23, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
   • Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2313, CESifo.
   • Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2011. "Bankruptcy: is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?," Working Papers 11-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
   • Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/41, European University Institute.
   • Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2007. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?," Working Papers 07-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
8. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
   • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Scholarly Articles 30728046, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
10. Irena Grosfeld & Iraj Hashi, 2001. "The Evolution of Ownership Structure in Firms Privatized through Wholesale Schemes in the Czech Republic and Poland," CASE Network Reports 0049, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
11. Christa Hainz, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Financial Control and Sequential Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 336-355, June.
    • Hainz, Christa, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets - Financial Control and Sequential Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 124, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Christa Hainz, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets – Financial Control and Sequential Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 1763, CESifo.
12. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    • Prat, Andrea, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Prat, Andrea, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
13. Johan Lagerlöf, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, March.
    • Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
14. Arjen de Vetten, 2007. "Incentives and Regional Coordination in Employment Services," CPB Memorandum 190, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
15. Georg Gebhardt, 2000. "Innovation and Venture Capital," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1404, Econometric Society.
16. Chong-En Bai & David D. Li & Yingyi Qian & Yijiang Wang, 1999. "Limiting Government Predation Through Anonymous Banking: A Theory with Evidence from China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 275, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
17. Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
    • David E. Wildasin, 2001. "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations," Public Economics 0112002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
18. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October.
19. Haijin Lin, 2006. "Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(4), pages 1017-1041, December.
20. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
    • Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
21. Lukas Angst & Karol Borowiecki, 2014. "Delegation and motivation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 363-393, March.
    • Lukas ANGST & Karol Jan BOROWIECKI, 2011. "Delegation and Motivation," Trinity Economics Papers tep1611, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
22. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce I. Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2017. "Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 23273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton & Raphael Boleslavsky, 2017. "Competing For Capital: Auditing And Credibility In Financial Reporting," Working Paper 1377, Economics Department, Queen's University.
23. Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
24. Anil Arya & Shyam Sunder & Jonathan Glover, 2002. "Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm295, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2003.
    • Anil Arya & Shyam Sunder & Jonathan Glover, 2002. "Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm295, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2003.
25. Alexander Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Mixed up? that’s good for motivation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 107-125, January.
    • Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2004. "Mixed up? That's good for motivation," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/22, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Sep 2004.
    • Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2004. "Mixed Up? That's Good for Motivation," IZA Discussion Papers 1331, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
26. Ajit Mishra, 1998. "A Theory Of Discrimination Based On Signalling And Strategic Information Acquisition," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 088, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    • Ajit Mishra, 2000. "A Theory of Discrimination Based on Signaling and Strategic Information Acquisition," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0675, Econometric Society.
27. Larry Karp, 2005. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 229-251, June.
    • Karp, Larry S., 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," CUDARE Working Papers 25100, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Karp, Larry, 2005. "Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8364p7br, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    • Karp, Larry, 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4z62b52k, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
28. Wernerfelt, Birger, 2003. "Indirect Adjustment-Costs Under Alternative Coordination Regimes," Working papers 4336-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
29. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2004. "Intertemporal aggregation and incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 643-657.
30. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
    • Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    • Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
31. Bruno Cassiman, 1996. "Influence activity and the organization of research and development," Economics Working Papers 264, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997.
32. Dittmann, Ingolf, 1999. "How reliable should auditors be?: optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 523-546, September.
33. Levy, Gilat, 2000. "Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3627, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 404, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
34. Irena Grosfeld & Iraj Hashi, 2003. "Mass Privatisation, Corporate Governance and Endogenous Ownership Structure," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-596, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
35. Denis Gromb & David Scharfstein, 2002. "Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 9001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Scharfstein, David S. & Gromb, Denis, 2002. "Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 3652, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
36. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 617-633, December.
    • George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jun 2003.
37. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
38. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern, 2005. "From Team Spirit to Jealousy: The Pitfalls of Too Much Transparency," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/08, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jul 2005.
    • Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht, 2005. "From Team Spirit to Jealousy: The Pitfalls of Too Much Transparency," IZA Discussion Papers 1661, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
39. Roger, Guillaume, 2016. "Participation in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 10-24.
40. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & K. Sivaramakrishnan., "undated". "The Interaction between Decision and Control Problems and the Value of Information," Corporate Finance & Organizations _016, Ohio State University.
41. Chong-En Bai & David D. Li & Yingyi Qian & Yijiang Wang, 1999. "Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?," Working Papers 99014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    • Bai, Chong-En & Li, David Daokui & Qian, Yingyi & Wang, Yijiang, 1999. "Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2221, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
42. Seabright, Paul & Berardi, Nicoletta, 2010. "Joint Ventures as a Commitment Device Against Lobbies," CEPR Discussion Papers 7714, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
43. Boot, Arnoud W A & Macey, Jonathon, 1999. "Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, 1999. "Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 266, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
44. Schuett, Florian & Wagner, Alexander K., 2011. "Hindsight-biased evaluation of political decision makers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1621-1634.
    • Florian Schuett & Alexander K. Wagner, 2008. "Hindsight biased policy evaluation," LERNA Working Papers 08.08.252, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
45. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 26/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
46. Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 60-63.
47. Ambec, S., 2003. "A theory of authority in bilateral contracting," Working Papers 200303, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
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48. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
49. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
50. Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
    • A Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1994. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0043, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX..
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    • Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1996. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 73, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    • A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1996. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 0073, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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51. Gebhardt, Georg, 2006. "A Soft Budget Constraint Explanation for the Venture Capital Cycle," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 173, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
52. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
53. Viral V. Acharya & Ramin P. Baghai & Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, 2013. "Labor Laws and Innovation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 997-1037.
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54. Park, Albert & Shen, Minggao, 2008. "Refinancing and decentralization: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 703-730, June.
55. Yingyi Qian & Yijiang Wang, 2000. "Limiting Government Predation through Anonymous Banking: A Theory and Evidence from China," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1935, Econometric Society.
56. Bruno Maria Parigi & Loriana Pelizzon & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2013. "Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series 4496, CESifo.
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57. Kristin Aarland & James C. Davis & J. Vernon Henderson & Yukako Ono, 2007. "Spatial organization of firms: the decision to split production and administration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 480-494, June.
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58. Ramji Balakrishnan & Haijin Lin & Konduru Sivaramakrishnan, 2020. "Screening Talent for Task Assignment: Absolute or Percentile Thresholds?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 831-868, September.
59. Patibandla, Murali, 2001. "Equity Pattern, Corporate Governance and Performance: A Study of India’s Corporate Sector," Working Papers 9-2001, Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics and Management.
60. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Pre-Contractual Information Acquisition," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv154, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
61. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 1998. "Efectos del análisis crediticio sobre los incentivos empresariales," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(3), pages 361-392, September.
62. Neil Doherty & Kent Smetters, 2005. "Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 375-391, September.
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63. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Doug Schroeder & Jonathan Glover, 2002. "Depreciation in a model of probabilistic investment," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 681-697.
64. Frank B. Gigler & Thomas Hemmer, 2004. "On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 871-893, December.
65. Marino, Anthony M., 2014. "Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 9-21.
66. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
67. Gautier, Axel, 1999. "Optimal Monitoring in Teams," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999006, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
68. Marcel Boyer & Séverine Clamens, 1997. "Strategic Adoption of a New Technology under Uncertain Implementation," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-40, CIRANO.
69. Xiaojing Meng & Jie Joyce Tian, 2020. "Board Expertise and Executive Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5448-5464, November.
70. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
71. Ed Nosal, 2006. "Information Gathering By A Principal," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1093-1111, November.
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72. Mehmet Bac, 2009. "An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 233-256, June.
73. Christa Hainz, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets-Financial Control & Sequential Investment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp830, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
74. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Jonathan Glover & K. Sivaramakrishnan, 2000. "Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 205-216, February.
75. Anil Arya & John C. Fellingham & Jonathan C. Glover & Douglas A. Schroeder & Gilbert Strang, 2000. "Inferring Transactions from Financial Statements," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 366-385, September.
76. Marcoul, Philippe, 2003. "A Theory of Advice Based on Information Search Incentives," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10357, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
77. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
78. Albert Park & Minggao Shen, 2002. "A Refinancing Model of Decentralization with Empirical Evidence from China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 461, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
79. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2021. "A Model of Challenge Funds: How Funding Availability and Selection Rigor Affect Project Quality," Working Paper 1470, Economics Department, Queen's University.
80. Juan J. Ganuza, 1998. "Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers 471, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2002.
81. Laux, Christian & Laux, Volker, 2024. "Accounting conservatism and managerial information acquisition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).