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Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas

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  1. Raja R Timilsina & Yutaka Kobayashi & Koji Kotani, 2022. "Non-kinship successors for resource sustainability," Working Papers SDES-2022-2, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2022.
  2. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2015. "The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 38-53.
  3. Bartels, Lara & Falk, Thomas & Duche, Vishwambhar & Vollan, Björn, 2022. "Experimental games in transdisciplinary research: The potential importance of individual payments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
  4. Deck, Cary & Howe, E. Lance & Reimer, Matthew & Alevy, Jonathan & Borash, Kyle, 2021. "Contests for shares of an uncertain resource," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  5. Jonathan E Bone & Brian Wallace & Redouan Bshary & Nichola J Raihani, 2015. "The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, January.
  6. Jason Delaney & Sarah Jacobson, 2016. "Payments or Persuasion: Common Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 747-772, December.
  7. Herings, P.J.J. & Meshalkin, A.V. & Predtetchinski, A., 2012. "A folk theorem for bargaining games," Research Memorandum 055, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Andreas, Diekmann & Przepiorka, Wojtek, 2015. "“Take One for the Team!” Individual Heterogeneity and the Emergence of Latent Norms in a Volunteer's Dilemma," SocArXiv q9xj6, Center for Open Science.
  9. Bruno Bonté & Stefano Farolfi & Nils Ferrand & Géraldine Abrami & Mamadou Ciss Diallo & Dimitri Dubois & Anne Johannet & Nils Ferrand, 2019. "Building new kinds of meta-models to analyse experimentally (companion) modelling processes in the field of natural resource management," Post-Print hal-02277141, HAL.
  10. Falk, Thomas & Zhang, Wei & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela & Bartels, Lara, 2021. "Games for triggering collective change in natural resource management: A conceptual framework and insights from four cases from India," IFPRI discussion papers 1995, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  11. Cherry, Todd L. & Cotten, Stephen J. & Jones, Luke R., 2013. "The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 329-341.
  12. Momeni, Fatemeh, 2021. "Voluntary and mandatory provision of common-pool resources with heterogeneous users," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 785-813.
  13. Stoddard, Brock & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington, 2014. "Allocating a voluntarily provided common-property resource: An experimental examination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 141-155.
  14. Farolfi, Stefano & Erdlenbruch, Katrin, 2020. "A classroom experimental game to improve the understanding of asymmetric common-pool resource dilemmas in irrigation water management," International Review of Economics Education, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
  15. Raja Timilsina & Koji Kotani & Yoshio Kamijo, 2016. "Sustainability of common pool resources: A field-experimental approach," Working Papers SDES-2016-6, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Apr 2016.
  16. Benjamin Ouvrard & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Alban Thomas & Dishant Jojit James & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2023. "Distributive Justice in the Field: How do Indian Farmers Share Water? ," Working Papers hal-04150233, HAL.
  17. Anderies, John M. & Janssen, Marco A. & Lee, Allen & Wasserman, Hannah, 2013. "Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 166-176.
  18. Charles A. Holt & Cathleen A. Johnson & Courtney A. Mallow & Sean P. Sullivan, 2012. "Water Externalities: Tragedy of the Common Canal," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1142-1162, April.
  19. Nhim, Tum & Richter, Andries, 2022. "Path dependencies and institutional traps in water governance – Evidence from Cambodia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  20. Wojtek Przepiorka & Andreas Diekmann, 2018. "Heterogeneous groups overcome the diffusion of responsibility problem in social norm enforcement," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(11), pages 1-18, November.
  21. Marianne Lefebvre, 2011. "Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources when Self-insurance is Available: an Experiment," Working Papers 11-22, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
  22. Falk, Thomas & Kumar, Shalander & Srigiri, Srinivasa, 2019. "Experimental games for developing institutional capacity to manage common water infrastructure in India," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 260-269.
  23. Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2016. "Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, December.
  24. Jennifer Jacquet & David Frank & Christopher Schlottmann, 2013. "Asymmetrical Contributions to the Tragedy of the Commons and Some Implications for Conservation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 5(3), pages 1-13, March.
  25. Otto, Ilona M. & Wechsung, Frank, 2014. "The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 10-20.
  26. Wolf, Stephan & Dron, Cameron, 2020. "The effect of an experimental veil of ignorance on intergenerational resource sharing: empirical evidence from a sequential multi-person dictator game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
  27. Wakamatsu, Mihoko & Managi, Shunsuke, 2020. "Communication and heterogeneity in a commons dilemma: an experimental approach," MPRA Paper 115628, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Chai, Ying & Zhang, Haoran & Luo, Yong & Wang, Yi & Zeng, Yunmin, 2021. "Payments for ecosystem services programs, institutional bricolage, and common pool resource management: Evidence from village collective-managed irrigation systems in China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
  29. Wolf, Stephan & Dron, Cameron, 2015. "Intergenerational sharing of non-renewable resources: An experimental study using Rawls's Veil of Ignorance," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2015, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
  30. Brock V. Stoddard & Caleb A. Cox & James M. Walker, 2021. "Incentivizing provision of collective goods: Allocation rules," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(4), pages 1345-1365, April.
  31. Juan A Lacomba & Francisco Lagos & Javier Perote, 2017. "The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(7), pages 1-14, July.
  32. Farjam, Mike & Wolf, Stephan, 2021. "If future generations had a say: An experiment on fair sharing of a common-pool resource across generations," SocArXiv 759ks, Center for Open Science.
  33. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2012. "Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  34. Dale T. Manning & J. Edward Taylor & James E. Wilen, 2018. "General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(1), pages 75-101, January.
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