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Intergenerational sharing of non-renewable resources: An experimental study using Rawls's Veil of Ignorance

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  • Wolf, Stephan
  • Dron, Cameron

Abstract

[Introduction ...] The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we argue how a counterfactual “bargaining with future individuals” situation may be realized as an experimental setup. That way, we can test the behavior of real individuals in a setting which approximates Rawls’s Original Position in which people are ignorant to which generation they will belong. Section 3 first describes related intergenerational resource sharing experiments which all focus on the descriptive level. Then, we briefly explain Frohlich/Oppenheimer’ experimental approach for deriving intragenerational distributive norms in the lab. Our intermediate conclusion is that similar “intergenerational bargaining experiment” may contribute to the derivation of intergenerational distributive norms. Section 4 describes our own experimental design and the hypotheses we test. Section 5 presents our results; section 6 concludes.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolf, Stephan & Dron, Cameron, 2015. "Intergenerational sharing of non-renewable resources: An experimental study using Rawls's Veil of Ignorance," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2015, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cenwps:012015
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariateresa Silvi & Emilio Padilla Rosa, 2017. "Pro-environmental behavior: On the interplay of intrinsic motivations and external conditions," Working Papers wpdea1703, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.

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