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The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources

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  • Cherry, Todd L.
  • Cotten, Stephen J.
  • Jones, Luke R.

Abstract

Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource provision leads to individual strategic behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Cherry, Todd L. & Cotten, Stephen J. & Jones, Luke R., 2013. "The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 329-341.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:35:y:2013:i:3:p:329-341
    DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2013.03.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Privatization Wages
      by Patrick Behrer in Sense and Sustainability on 2014-04-09 19:00:16

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    1. Tanja Baerlein & Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2015. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, January.
    2. Momeni, Fatemeh, 2021. "Voluntary and mandatory provision of common-pool resources with heterogeneous users," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 785-813.
    3. Freeman, Matthew A. & Anderson, Christopher M., 2017. "Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 123-129.
    4. Dale T. Manning & J. Edward Taylor & James E. Wilen, 2018. "General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(1), pages 75-101, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common-pool resource; Experiment; Reciprocity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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