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Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dionne, Georges, 2000. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud," Working Papers 00-4, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  2. Daniel J. Clarke, 2011. "Reinsuring the Poor: Group Microinsurance Design and Costly State Verification," Economics Series Working Papers 573, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
  4. M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-70, CIRANO.
  5. Lu Li & Richard Peter, 2021. "Should we do more when we know less? The effect of technology risk on optimal effort," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(3), pages 695-725, September.
  6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6456 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2011. "Granting An Exit Option To Conduct An Audit," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 438-463, October.
  8. Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert, 2002. "Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 213-230, May.
  9. Cohen Alma, 2006. "The Disadvantages of Aggregate Deductibles," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, April.
  10. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
  11. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
  12. Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, 2001. "Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence From Automobile Insurance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 290-301, May.
  13. Scalera Domenico & Zazzaro Alberto, 2007. "The Unpleasant Effects of Price Deregulation in the European Third-Party Motor Insurance Market: A Theoretical Framework," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-30, October.
  14. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
  15. Guillaume Carlier & Rose-Anne Dana, 2003. "Pareto efficient insurance contracts when the insurer's cost function is discontinuous," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 871-893, June.
  16. Robert F. Graboyes, 2000. "Our money or your life : indemnities vs. deductibles in health insurance," Working Paper 00-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  17. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  18. Reda Aboutajdine & Pierre Picard, 2018. "Preliminary Investigations for Better Monitoring: Learning in Repeated Insurance Audits," Risks, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22, February.
  19. John E. Murray, 2011. "Asymmetric Information and Countermeasures in Early Twentieth‐Century American Short‐Term Disability Microinsurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 117-138, March.
  20. M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
  21. Neil Doherty & Kent Smetters, 2005. "Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 375-391, September.
  22. M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
  23. Donatella Porrini, 2002. "Frodi nell'assicurazione RC Auto: analisi economica e possibili rimedi," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 92(2), pages 109-138, March-Apr.
  24. Viaene, Stijn & Ayuso, Mercedes & Guillen, Montserrat & Van Gheel, Dirk & Dedene, Guido, 2007. "Strategies for detecting fraudulent claims in the automobile insurance industry," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 565-583, January.
  25. Hau, Arthur, 2008. "Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1680-1700, May.
  26. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
  27. Georges Dionne & Kili Wang, 2013. "Does insurance fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate with the business cycle?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 67-92, August.
  28. David S. Loughran, 2005. "Deterring Fraud: The Role of General Damage Awards in Automobile Insurance Settlements," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(4), pages 551-575, December.
  29. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582, December.
  30. Doherty, Neil A. & Muermann, Alexander, 2005. "Insuring the uninsurable: brokers and incomplete insurance contracts," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/24, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  31. Jiakun Zheng, 2020. "Optimal insurance design under narrow framing," Post-Print hal-04227370, HAL.
  32. Luccioni, Enrique, 2015. "Self-inflicted injury as a rational decision process: The cae of Citrus harvesters in Argentina," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 212212, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  33. Zheng, Jiakun, 2020. "Optimal insurance design under narrow framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 596-607.
  34. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
  35. Andersson, Fredrik & Skogh, Goran, 2003. "Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-280, April.
  36. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
  37. Domenico SCALERA & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2004. "From regulation to free market: the experience of the European motor insurance market," Working Papers 205, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  38. M. Boyer & Patrick González, 2004. "Optimal audit policies with correlated types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 325-334, August.
  39. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  40. Dionne, Georges & Gagné, Robert, 1997. "The non-optimality of deductible contracts against fraudulent claims: an empirical evidence in automobile insurance," Working Papers 97-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  41. Qin Lian & Harris Schlesinger, 2012. "Insurance Contract Design When the Insurer Has Private Information on Loss Size," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1039-1050, December.
  42. M. Martin Boyer & Richard Peter, 2020. "Insurance Fraud in a Rothschild–Stiglitz World," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(1), pages 117-142, March.
  43. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Pierre Picard, 1999. "Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 24(1), pages 29-54, June.
  44. Jill M. Bisco & Kathleen A. McCullough & Charles M. Nyce, 2019. "Postclaim Underwriting And The Verification Of Insured Information: Evidence From The Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(1), pages 7-38, March.
  45. R M Rejesus, 2003. "Ex post Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification or Falsification?," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 8(2), pages 29-46, September.
  46. Crocker, Keith J & Tennyson, Sharon, 2002. "Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 469-507, October.
  47. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  48. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  49. Georges Dionne & Kili C. Wang, 2011. "Does Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile theft Insurance Fluctuate with the Business Cycle ?," Cahiers de recherche 1121, CIRPEE.
  50. Stijn Viaene & Guido Dedene, 2004. "Insurance Fraud: Issues and Challenges," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 29(2), pages 313-333, April.
  51. Katja Müller & Hato Schmeiser & Joël Wagner, 2016. "The impact of auditing strategies on insurers’ profitability," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 46-79, January.
  52. repec:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:1:p:101-34 is not listed on IDEAS
  53. Boyer, M.M., 1998. "Poll Subsidy and Excise Tax," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 98-13, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  54. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO.
  55. M. Martin Boyer & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2001. "Inflation as a Strategic Response," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-26, CIRANO.
  56. Doherty, Neil A. & Laux, Christian & Muermann, Alexander, 2010. "Insuring Non-verifiable Losses and the Role of Internediaries," Working Papers 11-31, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
  57. Boyer, Martin, 2001. "Les clauses de valeur à neuf sont-elles optimales?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(1), pages 53-74, mars.
  58. Farbmacher, Helmut & Löw, Leander & Spindler, Martin, 2022. "An explainable attention network for fraud detection in claims management," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 228(2), pages 244-258.
  59. Boyer, M. Martin & Schiller, Jörg, 2003. "Merging automobile regulatory bodies: The case of Atlantic Canada," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 11, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
  60. Richard Watt, 2003. "Curtailing Ex-Post Fraud in Risk Sharing Arrangements," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 247-263, September.
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