On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard
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DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01348551v3
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- Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
- Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2024.
"Nonlinear Reimbursement Rules for Preventive and Curative Medical Care,"
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11186, CESifo.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2024. "Nonlinear Reimbursement Rules for Preventive and Curative Medical Care," IZA Discussion Papers 17090, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2024. "Nonlinear reimbursement rules for preventive and curative medical care," TSE Working Papers 24-1527, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2024.
- Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2024. "Nonlinear reimbursement rules for preventive and curative medical care," Working Papers hal-04595597, HAL.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2024. "Nonlinear reimbursement rules for preventive and curative medical care," CEPR Discussion Papers 19200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sun, Huan & Wang, Haiyan & Steffensen, Sonja, 2022. "Mechanism design of multi-strategy health insurance plans under asymmetric information," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
- Sun, Huan & Wang, Haiyan, 2024. "Data-driven incentive mechanism design for chronic disease prevention from the perspective of government," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 652-668.
- Peng Yang & Zhiping Chen, 2023. "Optimal Private Health Insurance Contract towards the Joint Interests of a Policyholder and an Insurer," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-28, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
optimal control; health insurance; ex post moral hazard; audit; background risk;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2018-07-23 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2018-07-23 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2018-07-23 (Microeconomics)
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