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Frodi nell'assicurazione RC Auto: analisi economica e possibili rimedi

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  • Donatella Porrini

    (Università degli Studi di Milano)

Abstract

The article investigates the problem of the presence of fraudulent behaviors in the Italian automobile insurance market. First of all the phenomenon is described by statistical data about the Italian insurance market. Secondly, the insurance fraud problem is analyzed considering the asymmetric information theory, and adverse selection and moral hazard categories; the traditional remedies in the economic theory are then considered in the particular case of insurance fraud. Particularly as remedy, monitoring procedure by the insurance companies and institutional policy instruments are examined. Finally, taking into account the US experience, some conclusions are drawn specifically for the Italian case.

Suggested Citation

  • Donatella Porrini, 2002. "Frodi nell'assicurazione RC Auto: analisi economica e possibili rimedi," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 92(2), pages 109-138, March-Apr.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:92:y:2002:i:2:p:109-138
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dionne, Georges & Gagné, Robert, 1997. "The non-optimality of deductible contracts against fraudulent claims: an empirical evidence in automobile insurance," Working Papers 97-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
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    7. El Bachir, Belhadji & Dionne, Georges, 1997. "Development of an expert system for the automatic detection of automobile insurance fraud," Working Papers 97-6, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    8. Landes, Elisabeth M, 1982. "Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 49-65, April.
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    10. Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Asimmetrie informative e concorrenzialità nel mercato assicurativo italiano," Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 491-514.
    11. Caron, L. & Dionne, G., 1996. "Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 96-02, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
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    1. Scalera Domenico & Zazzaro Alberto, 2007. "The Unpleasant Effects of Price Deregulation in the European Third-Party Motor Insurance Market: A Theoretical Framework," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-30, October.
    2. Domenico SCALERA & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2004. "From regulation to free market: the experience of the European motor insurance market," Working Papers 205, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.

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