Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Jörg Schiller, 2006.
"The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(3), pages 421-438, September.
- Schiller, Jörg, 2002. "The impact of insurance fraud detection systems," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 8, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Joerg Schiller, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Microeconomics 0309003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Oct 2003.
- Jörg Schiller, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Microeconomics 0310001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lammers, Frauke & Schiller, Jörg, 2010. "Contract design and insurance fraud: An experimental investigation," FZID Discussion Papers 19-2010, University of Hohenheim, Center for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID).
- Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Mahito Okura, 2013. "The relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 14(2), pages 120-128, February.
- Hunsoo Kim & W. Jean Kwon, 2006. "A Multi‐Line Insurance Fraud Recognition System: A Government‐Led Approach in Korea," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 9(2), pages 131-147, September.
- Luccioni, Enrique, 2015. "Self-inflicted injury as a rational decision process: The cae of Citrus harvesters in Argentina," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 212212, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Boyer, M. Martin & Schiller, Jörg, 2003. "Merging automobile regulatory bodies: The case of Atlantic Canada," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 11, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Nell, Martin & Schiller, Jörg, 2002. "Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 7, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
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