IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/pubeco/v58y1995i3p319-336.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Hiriart, Yolande & Thomas, Lionel, 2017. "The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 111-136.
  2. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2010. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 281-302, July.
  3. Helm, Carsten, 2008. "How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 263-271, December.
  4. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort, 2006. "The benefits of extended liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 562-582, September.
  5. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2015. "Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners’ willingness to accept," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
  6. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996. "Environmental protection, producer insolvency and lender liability," Chapters, in: Anastasios Xepapadeas (ed.), Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources, chapter 1, pages 1-29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  7. Romain Bizet & Petyo Bonev & François Lévêque, 2017. "Are older nuclear reactors less safe? Evidence from incident data in the French fleet," Working Papers hal-01695160, HAL.
  8. Jason Shogren & Gregory Parkhurst & Prasenjit Banerjee, 2010. "Two Cheers and a Qualm for Behavioral Environmental Economics," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 235-247, June.
  9. Stéphane Hallegatte, 2012. "An exploration of the link between development, economic growth, and natural risk," Post-Print hal-00802047, HAL.
  10. Vislie, Jon, 2009. "Incentive Contracts for Public Health Care Provision under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," HERO Online Working Paper Series 2001:6, University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme.
  11. Cramer, Benjamin W., 2022. "The moral hazard of Lax FCC land use oversight for advanced network infrastructure," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1).
  12. Hussein, Mohamud & Martinez, Marian Garcia & Fearne, Andrew, 2013. "On The Efficiency of Management-Based Regulation: A Case Study of the UK Poultry Inspection Regime," 87th Annual Conference, April 8-10, 2013, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 158856, Agricultural Economics Society.
  13. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Fat-tail Climate Risks, Mechanism design, and Reputation," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124920, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  14. Huber, Michael, 2002. "Conceptualising Insurance: risk management under conditions of solvency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35991, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  15. María del Carmen García‐Alonso & Paul Levine & Antonia Morga, 2004. "Export Credit Guarantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 311-327, October.
  16. Hallegatte,Stephane & Bangalore,Mook & Jouanjean,Marie Agnes, 2016. "Higher losses and slower development in the absence of disaster risk management investments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7632, The World Bank.
  17. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2004. "Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 590-612, August.
  18. Stéphane Hallegatte & Jun Rentschler, 2015. "Risk Management for Development—Assessing Obstacles and Prioritizing Action," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(2), pages 193-210, February.
  19. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
  20. Stephane Hallegatte, 2017. "A Normative Exploration of the Link Between Development, Economic Growth, and Natural Risk," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 5-31, June.
  21. Qin, Botao & Shogren, Jason F., 2015. "Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 22-24.
  22. Strand, Jon, 1999. "Efficient environmental taxation under moral hazard," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 73-88, March.
  23. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2006. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation: A Mixed Model of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2006-06, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
  24. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
  25. Daiki Kishishita & Susumu Sato, 2021. "Optimal risk regulation of monopolists with subjective risk assessment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 251-279, June.
  26. Berardi, Simone & Marcelletti, Alessandra, 2017. "Optimal Bank Capital Requirements: An Asymmetric Information Perspective," LEAP Working Papers 2017/2, Luiss Institute for European Analysis and Policy.
  27. Thiago Morello, 2023. "An Agri-environmental Scheme for Reducing Inputs Subjected to Accidental Spillage: An Application to Agricultural Burnings by Smallholders," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(2), pages 383-408, February.
  28. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
  29. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2010. "Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 45-47, January.
  30. Wang, Fang & Gao, Yue & Dong, Wenxu & Li, Zhiwei & Jia, Xiaoping & Tan, Raymond R., 2017. "Segmented pinch analysis for environmental risk management," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 353-361.
  31. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-57, CIRANO.
  32. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 137-149.
  33. Meunier Guy & Ponssard Jean-Pierre, 2017. "Financing innovative green projects with asymmetric information and costly public funds," Working Papers 2017-55, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  34. Giuseppe Attanasi & Laura Concina & Caroline Kamaté & Valentina Rotondi, 2020. "Firm’s protection against disasters: are investment and insurance substitutes or complements?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 121-151, February.
  35. Kishore Gawande & Timothy Wheeler, 1999. "Measures of Effectiveness for Governmental Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(1), pages 42-58, January.
  36. Pascal Frantz & Norvald Instefjord, 2007. "Socially and privately optimal shareholder activism," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 23-43, March.
  37. Ollier, Sandrine & Thomas, Lionel, 2013. "Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2383-2403.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.