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Environmental Protection, Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

Abstract

The present paper deals with some legal issues surrounding environmental protection, namely those issues concerning the liability of the different firms and individuals directly or indirectly involved in the generation of environment damaging accidents. We consider in particular the potential effects of extending a firm's liability in case of an environmental disaster to its lenders and financiers when the cost of this liability is too large in relation to the firm's assets. Such extended liability regimes exist or are considered in many countries. The most important case is the 1980/85 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the USA that led to an extensive jurisprudence over the last fifteen years. Nous traitons ici du cadre légal de la responsabilité directe des entreprises lors de désastres environnementaux et de l'extension de cette responsabilité aux prêteurs en cas de faillite de l'entreprise. De tels régimes existent ou sont à l'étude dans plusieurs pays. Le cas le plus connu est le Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) de 1980/85 aux États-Unis et nous analysons les principaux cas de jurisprudence auxquels cette loi a donné lieu depuis 15 ans.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1995. "Environmental Protection, Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-50, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-50
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. BOYER, Marcel & PORRINI, Donatella, 2010. "Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 05-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort, 2006. "The benefits of extended liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 562-582, September.
    3. Schmitt, Andre & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2005. "Improving the prevention of environmental risks with convertible bonds," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 637-657, November.
    4. Fluet, Claude, 1999. "Régulation des risques et insolvabilité : le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 379-399, mars-juin.
    5. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2008. "The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-03, CIRANO.
    6. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO.
    7. Mondello, Gérard, 2012. "La responsabilité environnementale des prêteurs : difficultés juridiques et ensemble des possibles," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(2), pages 257-278, Juin.
    8. Boyer, Marcel & Porrini, Donatella, 2011. "The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 21-29, March.
    9. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2004. "Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 590-612, August.
    10. Mondello, Gerard, 2010. "Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety," Sustainable Development Papers 94736, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    11. Boyer, Marcel, 2020. "L’économie des organisations : Mythes et réalités," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 96(4), pages 471-498, Décembre.
    12. GOBERT, Karine & POITEVIN, Michel, 1998. "Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?," Cahiers de recherche 9808, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    13. Boyer, Marcel, 1996. "L’économie des organisations," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 72(3), pages 247-274, septembre.
    14. Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1996. "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," Cahiers de recherche 9604, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    15. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-57, CIRANO.
    16. Gérard Mondello, 2012. "Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 232-251, June.
    17. Touhami, A. & Martens, A., 1996. "Macroemesures in Computable General Equilibrium Models: a Probabilistic Treatment with an Application to Morocco," Cahiers de recherche 9621, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    18. Sandrine SPAETER, 2002. "Principe de precaution et comportements preventifs des firmes face aux risques environnementaux," Working Papers of BETA 2002-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    19. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Carel Vachon, 1999. "Dealing with Major Technological Risks," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-29, CIRANO.
    20. André SCHMITT & Sandrine SPAETER, 2002. "Improving the Prevention of Environmental Risks with Convertible Bonds," Working Papers of BETA 2002-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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