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Efficient environmental taxation under moral hazard

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  • Strand, Jon

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  • Strand, Jon, 1999. "Efficient environmental taxation under moral hazard," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 73-88, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:73-88
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1995. "Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 319-336, November.
    2. Jon Strand, 1999. "Efficient Environmental Taxation Under Worker-Firm Bargaining," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(2), pages 125-141, March.
    3. repec:bla:scandj:v:100:y:1998:i:4:p:765-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Frederick Ploeg & Cees Withagen, 1991. "Pollution control and the Ramsey problem," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 215-236, June.
    5. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    6. Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Environmental risks and bank liability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1427-1459, August.
    7. Jon Strand, 1994. "Environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(5), pages 495-509, October.
    8. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    9. Strand, J., 1998. "Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages in a Dynamic Labor Market: A Synthesis," Memorandum 22/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    10. Ordover, Janusz A. & Shapiro, Carl, 1984. "Advances in supervision technology and economic welfare: a general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 371-389, December.
    11. Gabel H. Landis & Sinclair-Desgagne Bernard, 1993. "Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 229-240, May.
    12. Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-322, June.
    13. Jon Strand, 1998. "Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(4), pages 765-780, December.
    14. Anthony Heyes, 1996. "Optimal taxation of flow pollutants when firms may also inflict catastrophic environmental damage," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(1), pages 1-14, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 71, pages 5-35.
    2. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Agricultural pollution of water, moral hazard and optimal audit policies [Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau]," Post-Print hal-01201071, HAL.
    3. Stamatina Hadjidema & Konstantinos Eleftheriou, 2013. "A Search Theoretic Approach on Environmental Taxation under Productive Differentials: A Note," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 19(2), pages 153-166, May.

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