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From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
  2. Aidt, Toke S. & Albornoz, Facundo & Gassebner, Martin, 2018. "The golden hello and political transitions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 157-173.
  3. Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2014. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-75.
  4. Thaize Challier, M.-Christine, 2010. "Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-67, March.
  5. Toke Aidt & Raphaël Franck, 2013. "How to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise: voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 229-250, June.
  6. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2016. "Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform: Theory and Evidence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 584-623, October.
  7. Andrew T. Young, 2015. "Hospitalitas," Working Papers 15-41, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  8. Diego F. Grijalva, 2024. "Revolutions of the mind, (threats of) actual revolutions, and institutional change," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 531-560, September.
  9. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2023. "Historical Representative Assembly Experiences and Constitutionalism Today," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(4), pages 665-680, December.
  10. Andrew Young, 2015. "From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 357-378, September.
  11. Daniel J. Smith & George R. Crowley & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, 2021. "Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 333-359, September.
  12. Toke Aidt & Peter Jensen, 2013. "Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 511-542, December.
  13. Marino, Maria & Donni, Paolo Li & Bavetta, Sebastiano & Cellini, Marco, 2020. "The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  14. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2020. "Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 133-186, June.
  15. Sebastian Garmann, 2018. "God save the queen, god save us all? Monarchies and institutional quality," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 65(2), pages 186-204, May.
  16. Young, Andrew T., 2018. "Hospitalitas: Barbarian settlements and constitutional foundations of medieval Europe," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 715-737, August.
  17. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  18. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The legacy of representation in medieval Europe for incomes and institutions today," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(1), pages 414-448, July.
  19. George Tridimas, 2011. "A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 58-82, March.
  20. Seghezza, Elena, 2015. "Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 71-81.
  21. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
  22. Toke S. Aidt & Gabriel Leon, 2016. "The Democratic Window of Opportunity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(4), pages 694-717, June.
  23. George Tridimas, 2010. "Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 119-144, June.
  24. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
  25. Tridimas, George, 2011. "Cleisthenes’ Choice: The Emergence of Direct Democracy in Ancient Athens," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 39-59.
  26. Tridimas, George, 2015. "War, disenfranchisement and the fall of the ancient Athenian democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 102-117.
  27. Roger Congleton, 2008. "America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 35-59, March.
  28. George Tridimas, 2021. "Constitutional monarchy as power sharing," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 431-461, December.
  29. Libman, Alexander & Schultz, André & Graeber, Thomas, 2011. "Tax return as a political statement," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 169, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
  30. Jeremy Horpedahl, 2011. "Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 203-220, September.
  31. Andrew Young, 2022. "The Peace of God," Rationality and Society, , vol. 34(1), pages 28-55, February.
  32. Congleton, R.D., 2007. "Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0764, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  33. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  34. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
  35. Jensen, Jeffrey L. & Yntiso, Sidak, 2019. "Democratic reversals and the size of government," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 21-49.
  36. Aidt, Toke S. & Eterovic, Dalibor S., 2011. "Political competition, electoral participation and public finance in 20th century Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 181-200, March.
  37. Grier, Robin & Young, Andrew T. & Grier, Kevin, 2022. "The causal effects of rule of law & property rights on fiscal capacity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  38. Apolte, Thomas, 2013. "The supply of democracy explaining voluntary democratic transition," CIW Discussion Papers 6/2013, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  39. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2019. "Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1241-1253, June.
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