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The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest

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  • Marino, Maria
  • Donni, Paolo Li
  • Bavetta, Sebastiano
  • Cellini, Marco

Abstract

This paper analyses the role of peaceful and violent protest in the democratization process. We interpret the democratization process as a sequence of phases so as to allow citizens' and elites' preferences for democracy to vary according to the particular phase that a country is experiencing. By doing so we jointly model the probability of protest and of moving through different phases of democracy taking into account time-constant and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we develop a multivariate finite mixture model that introduces a latent variable to capture unobservable factors. On a sample of 171 countries from 1971 to 2010, we provide evidence that protest matters in all phases of democratization, especially peaceful citizens’ demonstrations. On the contrary, violent protest has ambiguous consequences, as it favours initial democratic transitions but at the cost of threatening democratic consolidation. We also find that, after conditioning for economic and institutional controls, there is evidence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Marino, Maria & Donni, Paolo Li & Bavetta, Sebastiano & Cellini, Marco, 2020. "The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s017626802030029x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101881
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    4. Li Donni, Paolo & Marino, Maria & Welzel, Christian, 2021. "How important is culture to understand political protest?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    5. Apolte, Thomas, 2022. "Mass protests, security-elite defection, and revolution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 981-996.
    6. Leininger, Julia, 2022. "International democracy promotion in times of autocratization: From supporting to protecting democracy," IDOS Discussion Papers 21/2022, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Peaceful and violent protest; Democratization process; Unobserved heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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