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Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2021. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 650-668, June.
  2. Aviad Rubinstein & Raghuvansh R. Saxena & Clayton Thomas & S. Mathew Weinberg & Junyao Zhao, 2020. "Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness," Papers 2012.14898, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
  3. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Nisan, Noam & Ostrovsky, Rafail & Rosenbaum, Will, 2019. "A stable marriage requires communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 626-647.
  5. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  6. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 208, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  7. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
  8. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  9. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
  10. Jiangtao Li & Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?," GRAPE Working Papers 42, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
  11. Christian Basteck, 2024. "An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 502, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  12. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  13. Bó, Inácio & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2022. "The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 411-433.
  14. Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2024. "School Choice with Consent: an Experiment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1760-1805.
  15. Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 64, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
  16. Marco Castillo & Ahrash Dianat, 2021. "Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1365-1389, December.
  17. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  18. Andrew Kloosterman & Peter Troyan, 2023. "Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment," Papers 2305.03644, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  19. Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  20. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
  21. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
  22. Pinaki Mandal, 2022. "Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles," Papers 2204.02154, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
  23. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
  24. Basteck, Christian, 2024. "An axiomatization of the random priority rule," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2024-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  25. Catonini, Emiliano & Xue, Jingyi, 2020. "Local Dominance," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 1-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    • Emiliano Catonini & Jingyi Xue, 2020. "Local Dominance," Papers 2012.14432, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  26. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  27. Linda Cai & Clayton Thomas, 2019. "Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain," Papers 1910.04401, arXiv.org.
  28. Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  29. Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 181-196.
  30. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  31. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  32. Pinaki Mandal & Souvik Roy, 2022. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 261-290, February.
  33. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms," Papers 2212.08709, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  34. Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  35. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  36. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  37. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  38. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Guy Ishai & Clayton Thomas, 2024. "Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis," Papers 2409.18166, arXiv.org.
  39. Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019. "Obviousness around the clock," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  40. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  41. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  42. Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
  43. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
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