Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism
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DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001
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More about this item
Keywords
Matching; School choice; College admission problems; Top trading cycles; Pareto efficiency; Strategy-proofness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
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