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Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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Cited by:
- Li, Yunan, 2019. "Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 279-328.
- Yiding Feng & Yaonan Jin, 2024. "Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited," Papers 2411.03583, arXiv.org.
- Le, Phuong, 2018. "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015.
"Price discrimination through communication,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
- Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Baisa, Brian, 2017. "Auction design without quasilinear preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Yiding Feng & Jason Hartline & Yingkai Li, 2020. "Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities," Papers 2003.00545, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Debasis Mishra & Xu Lang, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Discussion Papers 22-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Yunan Li, 2017. "Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jun 2017.
- Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.
- Alireza Fallah & Michael I. Jordan & Annie Ulichney, 2024. "Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design," Papers 2406.00147, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015.
"Advances in Auctions,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017.
"Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 35-63.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112903, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Working Papers 15-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017. "Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 27, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023.
"Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 983-1007, May.
- Tuvana Pastine & Ivan Pastine, 2021. "Equilibrium Existence and Expected Payoffs in All-Pay Auctions with Constraints," Economics Department Working Paper Series n311-21.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Maria-Florina Balcan & Siddharth Prasad & Tuomas Sandholm, 2023. "Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information," Papers 2302.14234, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2-Person Case," Papers 2202.06245, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
- Arve, Malin, 2014.
"Procurement and predation: Dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 157-168.
- Arve, Malin, 2013. "Procurement and Predation: Dynamic Sourcing from Financially Constrained Suppliers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 441, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2019. "A note on optimal allocation with costly verification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 56-62.
- Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
- Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022. "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Discussion Papers 22-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2021.
"Redistribution Through Markets,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1665-1698, July.
- Dworczak, Pitor & Kominers, Scott Duke & Akbarpour, Mohammad, 2018. "Redistribution through Markets," Research Papers 3763, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2018. "Redistribution through Markets," Working Papers 2018-037, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Li, Yunan, 2020. "Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
- Seung Han Yoo, 2018. "Membership Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series 1804, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Santiago Balseiro & Anthony Kim & Mohammad Mahdian & Vahab Mirrokni, 2021. "Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 859-876, May.
- Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2020. "When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?," Discussion papers e-21-008, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014.
"On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-108.
- Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Li, Fei & Kotowski, Maciej Henryk, 2014. "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Scholarly Articles 11718166, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Chaithanya Bandi & Dimitris Bertsimas, 2014. "Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 1012-1038, November.
- Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
- Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020.
"Mechanism design without quasilinearity,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," ISER Discussion Paper 1005, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers 17-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers 17-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014.
"The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 420-423.
- Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Li, Fei, 2014. "The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information," Scholarly Articles 12559696, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Working Papers e116, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
- Juuso Toikka & Akhil Vohra & Rakesh Vohra, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022. "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Papers 2202.10378, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
- Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper 1001, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020.
"First-price auctions with budget constraints,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
- Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series rwp19-021, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Jianxin Rong & Ning Sun & Dazhong Wang, 2019. "A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 4(1), pages 39-86, November.
- Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
- Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2018. "Selling to a naive agent with two rationales," Discussion Papers 18-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2023. "Equitable rent division on a soft budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-14.
- Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2024. "An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 9(1), pages 105-130, December.
- Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2015. "Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 864-884, April.
- Vohra, Akhil & Toikka, Juuso & Vohra, Rakesh, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion: Reduced form approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
- Santiago R. Balseiro & Ozan Candogan, 2017. "Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 878-896, August.
- Richter, Michael, 2019. "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 30-47.
- Holzer, Jorge & McConnell, Kenneth, 2023. "Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
- Lang, Xu & Mishra, Debasis, 2024. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
- Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 335-359, August.
- Santiago Balseiro & Christian Kroer & Rachitesh Kumar, 2021. "Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees," Papers 2102.10476, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Ulrich Bergmann & Arkady Konovalov, 2024. "Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 36-57, March.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2017. "Endogenous budget constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 11-15.
- Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020. "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 386-405.
- Baisa, Brian & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2016. "Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 162-165.
- Yunan Li, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Sep 2017.
- Xu Lang & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Papers 2207.09253, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.