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All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers

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  • Selcuk, Cemil

Abstract

In a competitive market with budget-constrained buyers, an equilibrium where sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. If budgets are not too limited, then all-pay auctions emerge as the preferred selling format.

Suggested Citation

  • Selcuk, Cemil, 2024. "All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 242(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:242:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003707
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111886
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    2. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
    3. Cemil Selcuk, 2024. "Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions," Papers 2404.08762, arXiv.org.
    4. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020. "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    5. Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2010. "Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1354-1385, July.
    6. Selcuk, Cemil, 2017. "Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 262-285.
    7. Severinov, Sergei & Virag, Gabor, 2024. "Who wants to be an auctioneer?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    8. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    All-pay auctions; Directed search; Budget constraints; Competing auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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