Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Cited by:
- Ruiqin Wang & Cagil Kocyigit & Napat Rujeerapaiboon, 2025. "Equitable Auction Design: With and Without Distributions," Papers 2502.08369, arXiv.org.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-07-15 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2024-07-15 (Microeconomics)
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