Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition

Citations

Cited by:

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    • Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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27. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2010. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 734-747, December.
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28. Xin Zhao, 2018. "Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition," Working Paper Series 52, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
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33. Großer, Jens & Seebauer, Michael, 2016. "The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 205-226.
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