Optimal Search Auctions
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Other versions of this item:
- Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Optimal search auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 226-248, May.
- Charles Zhoucheng Zheng & Jacques Cremer & Yossef Spiegel, 2004. "Optimal search auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 615, Econometric Society.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z., 2005. "Optimal Search Auctions," IDEI Working Papers 293, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2005. "Optimal Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 1421, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021.
"The optimal sequence of prices and auctions,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
- Zhang, Hanzhe, 2019. "The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions," Working Papers 2019-3, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
- Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009.
"Auctions with costly information acquisition,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009.
"Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-1575, September.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," Economics Papers 2009-W05, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Lamy, 2013.
"“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
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- Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," Post-Print halshs-00840844, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00840844, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020.
"On the Benefits of Set-Asides,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
- Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688237, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," CIRED Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Post-Print halshs-03229982, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03229982, HAL.
- Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688261, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688231, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
- Szech, Nora, 2011. "Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 462-469.
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"Advances in Auctions,"
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- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shi, Xianwen, 2012.
"Optimal auctions with information acquisition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 666-686.
- Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition," Working Papers tecipa-302, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Hedyeh Beyhaghi & Linda Cai, 2023. "Recent Developments in Pandora's Box Problem: Variants and Applications," Papers 2308.12242, arXiv.org.
- Hagedorn, Marcus, 2009. "The value of information for auctioneers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2197-2208, September.
- Joosung Lee & Daniel Z. Li, 2018. "Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline," Working Papers 2018_03, Durham University Business School.
- Pancs, Romans, 2013. "Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 522-543.
- Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 288, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
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"Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 315-325, June.
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"Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, July.
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- Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_519, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Li, Daniel Z., 2017. "Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 47-50.
- Gal, Shmuel & Landsberger, Michael & Nemirovski, Arkadi, 2007. "Participation in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 75-103, July.
- Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z., 2006.
"Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 94-100, October.
- Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2006. "Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12663, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2006-09-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FMK-2006-09-03 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-03 (Game Theory)
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