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Dynamic Screening

Author

Listed:
  • David Lagziel

    (BGU)

  • Ehud Lehrer

    (Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

We study dynamic screening problems where elements are subjected to noisy evaluations and, in every stage, some of the elements are rejected while the remaining ones are independently re-evaluated in subsequent stages. We prove that, ceteris paribus, the quality of a dynamic screening process is not monotonic in the number of stages. Specifically, we examine the accepted elements' values and show that adding a single stage to a screening process may produce inferior results, in terms of stochastic dominance, whereas increasing the number of stages substantially leads to a first-best outcome.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2021. "Dynamic Screening," Working Papers 2101, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2101
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic screening; prefect screening; threshold strategies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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