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Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
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Cited by:
- Dütting, Paul & Fischer, Felix & Parkes, David C., 2016. "Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions," Scholarly Articles 32227268, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2011.
"A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 15-17, January.
- Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03583826, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03583826, HAL.
- White, Alexander, 2013. "Search engines: Left side quality versus right side profits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 690-701.
- Frank Kelly & Peter Key & Neil Walton, 2016. "Efficient Advert Assignment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(4), pages 822-837, August.
- Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl H., 2020. "Split it up to create incentives: Investment, public goods and crossing the river," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & David C. Parkes & Richard Steinberg, 2024.
"Combinatorial Auctions in Practice,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 517-553, June.
- Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio & Parkes, David C. & Steinberg, Richard, 2024. "Combinatorial auctions in practice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 124108, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and generalized second-price bids," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 331-350, March.
- Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014.
"Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2013. "Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections," Post-Print hal-00917099, HAL.
- Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2018. "To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 318-329.
- Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo, 2012.
"Profit-maximizing matchmaker,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 217-232.
- Hideo Konishi & Chiu Yu Ko, 2009. "Profit-Maximizing Matchmaker," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 721, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Apr 2012.
- Liran Einav & Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, 2016.
"Peer-to-Peer Markets,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 615-635, October.
- Liran Einav & Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, "undated". "Peer-to-Peer Markets," Discussion Papers 15-029, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Liran Einav & Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, 2015. "Peer-to-Peer Markets," NBER Working Papers 21496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021.
"Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
- Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," NBER Working Papers 28500, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Cramton, 2013.
"Spectrum Auction Design,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
- Peter Cramton, 2009. "Spectrum Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 09sad, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Dütting, Paul & Henzinger, Monika & Starnberger, Martin, 2018. "Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87419, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Kos, Nenad, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 233-249.
- Blumrosen, Liad & Feldman, Michal, 2013. "Mechanism design with a restricted action space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 424-443.
- Paul Dütting & Felix Fischer & David C. Parkes, 2019. "Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 196-211, February.
- Andor Goetzendorff & Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Robert W. Day, 2015. "Compact Bid Languages and Core Pricing in Large Multi-item Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(7), pages 1684-1703, July.
- Dütting, Paul & Fischer, Felix & Parkes, David C., 2019. "Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85877, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl, 2017.
"Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River,"
VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking
168136, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Simon Martin & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River," Vienna Economics Papers vie1706, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Gomes, Renato & Sweeney, Kane, 2014. "Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 421-437.
- Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl, 2017.
"Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River,"
VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking
168136, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Simon Martin & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River," Vienna Economics Papers 1706, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2011.
"A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 15-17, January.
- Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/3e7u7h227p9, Sciences Po.
- Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers hal-03583826, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03583826, HAL.
- Wilfred Amaldoss & Kinshuk Jerath & Amin Sayedi, 2016. "Keyword Management Costs and “Broad Match” in Sponsored Search Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(2), pages 259-274, March.
- Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017. "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 372-391.
- Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Yan, Haomin, 2021. "Position auctions with multi-unit demands," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 179-193.