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A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Perez

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This note offers characterizations of tightness and weak tightness. It shows that when the preference domainis that of continuous utility functions on the outcome space, the two notions are equivalent to the outcomeclosure property of Milgrom (2010a).

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03583826, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03583826
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.007
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03583826
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul, 2010. "Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 62-70, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    2. Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Simplification; Tightness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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