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Strategic Transmission of Costly Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
  2. Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2008. "Paradox of Credibility," Microeconomics Working Papers 22267, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  4. Potters, J.J.M. & van Winden, F.A.A.M., 1996. "The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying," Discussion Paper 1996-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 105-133, January.
  6. Noam Shamir & Hyoduk Shin, 2016. "Public Forecast Information Sharing in a Market with Competing Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2994-3022, October.
  7. Inga Deimen & Dezső Szalay, 2019. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1349-1374, April.
  8. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  9. Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel, 2019. "Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 651-672.
  10. Khalmetski, Kiryl & Rockenbach, Bettina & Werner, Peter, 2017. "Evasive lying in strategic communication," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 59-72.
  11. , & , M. & ,, 2013. "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  12. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
  13. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2012. "The War of Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 707-734.
    • Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2010. "The War of Information," Papers 9-13-2010, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  14. Antić, Nemanja & Persico, Nicola, 2023. "Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 299-310.
  15. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March.
  16. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March.
  17. Claudio Bonilla, 2004. "A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 51-67, October.
  18. Wang, Hefei, 2012. "Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1402-1413.
  19. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2022. "Why don’t we talk about it? Communication and coordination in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 257-278.
  20. Cheng Li & Christopher Cotton, 2016. "Clueless Politicians," Working Paper 1341, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  21. Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September.
  22. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
  23. Ajit Mishra & S Sarangi, 2010. "Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 14/10, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  24. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014. "Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 250-263.
  25. Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
  26. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 204-207, December.
  27. Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Competition for Access and Full Revelation of Evidence," Working Papers 2010-12, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  28. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
  29. repec:eid:wpaper:14/10 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
  31. Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013. "Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
  32. Aggey Semenov, 2012. "Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent," Working Papers 1215E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  33. Marianne Bertrand & Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3885-3920, December.
  34. Caldieraro, Fabio & Cunha, Marcus, 2022. "Consumers’ response to weak unique selling propositions: Implications for optimal product recommendation strategy," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 724-744.
  35. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
  37. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Evidence Revelation in Competitions for Access," Working Papers 2010-21, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  38. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  39. Oded Berman & Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi & Dmitry Krass, 2019. "Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1624-1641, April.
  40. Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Disclosure Risk and Price Drift," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 351-379, May.
  41. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2016. "Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 181-215, July.
  42. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
  43. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2014. "Let's Talk It Over: Communication and Coordination in Teams," Working Papers 2014:2, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 18 Apr 2018.
  44. Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2019. "Evasion of guilt in expert advice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 296-310.
  45. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  46. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Kundu, Tapas, 2014. "Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 124-142.
  47. Hertel, Jo & Smith, John, 2009. "Not so cheap talk: a model of advice with communication costs," MPRA Paper 17056, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  48. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.
  49. David C Chan & Michael J Dickstein, 2019. "Industry Input in Policy Making: Evidence from Medicare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(3), pages 1299-1342.
  50. Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 153-160.
  51. Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.
  52. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  53. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2010. "A Theory of Advocates: Trading Advice for In‡fluence," Working Papers 2010-17, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  54. , & , J. & ,, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
  55. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  56. Seyed Komail Tayebi & Ahmad Googerdchian, 2007. "A Difference-in-Differences (DID) Analysis of Financial Integration and International Trade in ASEAN+5," Iranian Economic Review (IER), Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran, vol. 12(3), pages 109-126, fall & wi.
  57. Mana Komai & Mark Stegeman, 2010. "Leadership based on asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 35-63, March.
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