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A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology

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  • Claudio Bonilla

Abstract

This study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition. I develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment. Three important results arise for thehomogeneous-polity case. First, the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election. Second,a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party. Third,political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Bonilla, 2004. "A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 51-67, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:1:p:51-67
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-6157-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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