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Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Philippe Platteau

    (Center for Research in the Economics of Development, University of Namur)

  • Vincent Somville

    (Center for Research in the Economics of Development, University of Namur)

  • Zaki Wahhaj

    (Department of International Development, University of Oxford)

Abstract

Common wisdom as well as sound analytical arguments suggest that stronger punishment of deviant behavior meted out by a principal typically prompts the agents to better conform with his objectives. Addressing the specific issue of donor-beneficiary relationships in the context of participatory development programs, we nevertheless show that greater tolerance on the part of donors may, under certain conditions, favor rather than hurt the interests of the poor. Also, greater uncertainty surrounding the donor's knowledge regarding the poor's preference may have the same paradoxical effect. Critical features of our framework are: (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite in dealing with external agencies, (ii) the elite choose the project proposed to the donor strategically, knowing that the latter has a certain amount of tolerance toward elite capture and an imperfect knowledge of the poor's priorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Philippe Platteau & Vincent Somville & Zaki Wahhaj, 2011. "Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay," Working Papers 1103, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:nam:wpaper:1103
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    4. Joaquín Morales Belpair, 2016. "Decentralized aid and democracy," Investigación & Desarrollo, Universidad Privada Boliviana, vol. 2(1), pages 5-17.
    5. Ronelle Burger & Indraneel Dasgupta & Trudy Owens, 2015. "A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(1), pages 71-111.
    6. Fałkowski, Jan & Kurek, Przemysław J., 2024. "Religious symbols in the public sphere and development of the third sector: Some evidence from rural Poland," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 495-508.
    7. Lingling Qiu & Weizhong Zeng & Shashi Kant & Sen Wang, 2021. "The Role of Social Capital in Rural Households’ Perceptions toward the Benefits of Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects: Evidence from a Rural Household Survey in Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces, China," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-16, January.
    8. Buntaine, Mark T. & Daniels, Brigham & Devlin, Colleen, 2018. "Can information outreach increase participation in community-driven development? A field experiment near Bwindi National Park, Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 407-421.
    9. C. A. Etiegni & K. Irvine & M. Kooy, 2017. "Playing by whose rules? Community norms and fisheries rules in selected beaches within Lake Victoria (Kenya) co-management," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 1557-1575, August.
    10. Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2018. "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 143-157.
    11. Morales, Joaquin & Serfilippi, Elena, 2017. "When NGOs fail: A model of advocacy and services provision in weak democracies," MPRA Paper 91506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    community-driven development; aid effectiveness; elite capture; preference targeting; information distortion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy

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