Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

Citations

Cited by:

1. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
2. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
   • Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 11105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Claude Fluet & Winand Emons, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," Diskussionsschriften dp1601, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
   • Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-06, CIRANO.
3. Jay Lu & Simon Board, 2015. "Information Provision and Consumer Search," 2015 Meeting Papers 1427, Society for Economic Dynamics.
4. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2018. "Adversarial Persuasion with Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 1811, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
5. Newton Jonathan, 2014. "Cheap Talk and Editorial Control," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
   • Newton, Jonathan, 2013. "Cheap talk and editorial control," Working Papers 2013-01, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
6. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
   • Pablo Amorós, 2022. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Working Papers 2022-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
7. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
8. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
9. MohammadAmin Fazli & Mahdi Lashkari & Hamed Taherkhani & Jafar Habibi, 2022. "A Novel Experts Advice Aggregation Framework Using Deep Reinforcement Learning for Portfolio Management," Papers 2212.14477, arXiv.org.
10. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Working Papers of BETA 2021-40, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 2108, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
11. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2020. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4958-4979, November.
    • Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Ottaviani, Marco, 2022. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 16901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
12. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design," Papers 2401.03671, arXiv.org.
13. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
14. Lichtig, Avi & Weksler, Ran, 2023. "Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    • Avi Lichtig & Ran Weksler, 2023. "Information Transmission in Voluntary Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_405, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
15. Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 60-63.
16. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
17. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Information disclosure with many alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(4), pages 851-873, November.
18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5umu4i0hei8jkbdr8rppdqcall is not listed on IDEAS
19. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
20. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5umu4i0hei8jkbdr8rppdqcall is not listed on IDEAS
21. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2011. "Competition in Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 17436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
22. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
23. Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016. "Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
    • Froeb, Luke M. & Ganglmair, Bernhard & Tschantz, Steven, 2016. "Adversarial decision-making: Choosing between models constructed by interested parties," MPRA Paper 71501, University Library of Munich, Germany.
24. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
25. Karakoç Gülen, 2022. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 527-556, June.
26. Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2018. "When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 186-189.
27. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2018. "Balance of opinions in expert panels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 151-154.
28. Yingni Guo, 2021. "Information transmission and voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 835-868, October.
29. Paul E. Fischer & Mirko S. Heinle & Kevin C. Smith, 2020. "Constrained listening, audience alignment, and expert communication," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1037-1062, December.
30. repec:ema:worpap:2021-02_v2 is not listed on IDEAS
31. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
32. Qiang Gong & Jie Shuai & Huanxing Yang, 2023. "Informational correlation and selective disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 645-683, August.
33. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
34. Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2021. "Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 1-27.
35. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
36. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
37. Sourav Bhattacharya & Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "On the Optimality of Diverse Expert Panels in Persuasion Games," Working Paper 516, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2013.
38. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.