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Persuading Voters

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2018. "Targeting in quantum persuasion problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 142-149.
  2. Ozan Candogan & Kimon Drakopoulos, 2020. "Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 497-515, March.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  4. Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton & Raphael Boleslavsky, 2017. "Competing For Capital: Auditing And Credibility In Financial Reporting," Working Paper 1377, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  5. repec:ris:msuecw:2019_006 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  7. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 672-706.
  8. Alessandra Casella & Antonin Macé, 2021. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 57-86, August.
  9. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
  10. Denter, Philipp, 2020. "Campaign contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  11. Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024. "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  12. Redlicki, B., 2017. "Spreading Lies," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1747, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  13. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
  14. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
  15. Philipp Denter & Martin Dumav & Boris Ginzburg, 2021. "Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 2033-2057.
  16. Ferrari, Luca, 2016. "How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 157-160.
  17. Inés Moreno de Barreda & Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2017. "Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: Media Power via Correlation of News Content," Economics Series Working Papers 836, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  18. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 455-482, May.
  19. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf & Dae-Hee Yoon, 2021. "The Impact of Uniform Pricing Regulations on Incentives to Generate and Disclose Accounting Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1975-1992, March.
  20. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
  21. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2019. "Private Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 185-217.
  22. Ichihashi, Shota, 2019. "Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
  23. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
  24. , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  26. Kimon Drakopoulos & Shobhit Jain & Ramandeep Randhawa, 2021. "Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 828-853, February.
  27. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2020. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4958-4979, November.
  28. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2019. "Persuasion on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Federico Vaccari, 2023. "Influential news and policy-making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1363-1418, November.
  30. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
  31. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  32. Victor Augias & Daniel M. A. Barreto, 2020. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," Papers 2011.13846, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
  33. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2318, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  34. Jeong, Daeyoung, 2019. "Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 50-80.
  35. Youzong Xu, 2019. "Collective decision-making of voters with heterogeneous levels of rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 267-287, January.
  36. Chen Jidong & Fey Mark & Kristopher W. Ramsay, 2017. "A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-10, June.
  37. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  38. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
  39. Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Persuading part of an audience," Papers 1903.00129, arXiv.org.
  40. Dughmi, Shaddin, 2019. "On the hardness of designing public signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 609-625.
  41. Maryam Saeedi & Ali Shourideh, 2020. "Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard," Papers 2008.09529, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  42. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  43. Christian Salas, 2019. "Persuading policy-makers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 507-542, October.
  44. Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2017. "The downsides of information transmission and voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 43-59, October.
  45. Kerman, Toygar & Tenev, Anastas P., 2021. "Persuading communicating voters," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  46. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
  47. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  48. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "Optimal information censorship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 377-385.
  49. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2022. "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2283-2318, September.
  50. Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  51. Raphaela Hennigs, 2019. "Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-16_1, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  52. Saad Azmat & Haiqa Ali & Kym Brown & Michael Skully, 2021. "Persuasion in Islamic finance," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 46(2), pages 272-286, May.
  53. Liu, Shuo, 2019. "Voting with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.
  54. Alvaro J. Name-Correa & Huseyin Yildirim, 2018. "A capture theory of committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 135-154, October.
  55. Takashi Ui, 2020. "LQG Information Design," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 018, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  56. Davin Raiha, 2018. "Economic influence activities," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 830-843, October.
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