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A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design

Author

Listed:
  • Chen Jidong

    (Business School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China)

  • Fey Mark

    (Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, 109 Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627, USA)

  • Kristopher W. Ramsay

    (Department of Politics, Princeton University, 038 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA)

Abstract

Various well known agreement theorems show that if players have common knowledge of actions and a “veto" action is available to every player, then they cannot agree to forgo a Pareto optimal outcome simply because of private information in settings with unique equilibrium. We establish a nonspeculation theorem which is more general than previous results and is applicable to political and economic situations that generate multiple equilibria. We demonstrate an application of our result to the problem of designing an independent committee free of private persuasion.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Jidong & Fey Mark & Kristopher W. Ramsay, 2017. "A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-10, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:10:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2015-0103
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016. "Persuading Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
    2. Schnakenberg, Keith E., 2015. "Expert advice to a voting body," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 102-113.
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