How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.041
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011.
"Bayesian Persuasion,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000369, www.najecon.org.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997.
"Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
- Myerson, Roger B., 2000.
"Large Poisson Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1997. "Large Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2011.
"Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 183-211.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2010. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000498, www.najecon.org.
- Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016.
"Persuading Voters,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "Persuading voters," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58674, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Persuading voters," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67953, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1998.
"Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Discussion Papers 1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011.
"On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
- GOERTZ, Johanna M. & MANIQUET, François, 2009. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2017. "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 120-123.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012.
"One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Working Papers ECARES 2008-017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2014.
"Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 25-28.
- GOERTZ, Johanna M.M & MANIQUET, François, 2014. "Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2613, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016.
"Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2015. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 777, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Laurent Bouton & A. Llorente-Saguer, 2016. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/242105, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Matías Núñez, 2014.
"The strategic sincerity of Approval voting,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
- Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.
- Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019.
"Pivotal persuasion,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
- Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
- François Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2015.
"Approval quorums dominate participation quorums,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 1-27, June.
- Maniquet, François; Morelli, Massimo, 2010. "Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/13, European University Institute.
- MANIQUET, François & MORELLI, Massimo, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2666, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MANIQUET, François & MORELLI, Massimo & ,, 2013. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Daron Acemoglu & Munther A. Dahleh & Ilan Lobel & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011.
"Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(4), pages 1201-1236.
- Daron Acemoglu & Munther A. Dahleh & Ilan Lobel & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2008. "Bayesian Learning in Social Networks," NBER Working Papers 14040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gratton, Gabriele, 2014.
"Pandering and electoral competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
- Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Pandering and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22B, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Mengel, Friederike & Rivas, Javier, 2017.
"Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 190-221.
- Javier Rivas Ruiz & F Mengel, 2015. "Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments," Department of Economics Working Papers 44/15, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2015. "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 339-375, November.
- Mandler, Michael, 2012. "The fragility of information aggregation in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 257-268.
- Johanna Goertz & Francois Maniquet, 2011. "On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 3457, CESifo.
- Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011.
"On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
- GOERTZ, Johanna M. & MANIQUET, François, 2009. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Paper 325, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2008.
- Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 4-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Youzong Xu, 2019. "Collective decision-making of voters with heterogeneous levels of rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 267-287, January.
- Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 04-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
- GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
More about this item
Keywords
Strategic voting; Large Poisson games; Public information; Partisan voters;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:157-160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.