Managing a Conflict
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Cited by:
- Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
- Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
- Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2021. "Peace through bribing," Papers 2107.11575, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HPE-2017-02-19 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2017-02-19 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-02-19 (Microeconomics)
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