Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach
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- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 421-439, Springer.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, July.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper De Vries & Casper G, de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 373, CESifo.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-103/2, Tinbergen Institute.
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More about this item
Keywords
AUCTIONS ; ENVIRONMENT ; LEGAL SYSTEM;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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