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Arbeitsgruppen und ihre Bestimmungsgründe: Eine empirische Untersuchung im deutschen Maschinenbau

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  • Müller, Harry

Abstract

Betriebliche Arbeitsgruppen sind eine in der deutschen Industrie häufig anzutreffende Form der Fertigungsorganisation. Betrachtet man die innerbetriebliche Organisation aus der Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik, so kann man die Arbeitsgruppe als eine Institution verstehen, mit deren Hilfe Transaktionskosten gesenkt werden sollen. Durch die Zuweisung von Entscheidungsrechten an eine Gruppe von Arbeitnehmern soll deren Koordination und Motivation im Vergleich zur klassischen Fließfertigung verbessert werden. Auf diese Weise lassen sich Komplexität, Unsicherheit und Spezifität als mögliche Bestimmungsgründe für den Einsatz von Arbeitsgruppen ableiten. Der Einfluss von Komplexität, Unsicherheit und Spezifität wird mit Hilfe von Daten aus dem deutschen Maschinenbau überprüft. Es stellt sich heraus, dass Betriebe, die komplexe Produkte herstellen, verstärkt mit Hilfe von Arbeitsgruppen produzieren. Die existenzielle Abhängigkeit des Betriebs von bestimmten Kunden kann als Kennzeichen des Spezifitätsproblems betrachtet werden und hat ebenfalls einen positiven Einfluss auf den Einsatz von Arbeitsgruppen. Für die Vermutung, dass bei Unsicherheiten in der Produktionsplanung verstärkt auf Arbeitsgruppen zurückgegriffen wird, findet sich indes nur eine schwache empirische Evidenz.

Suggested Citation

  • Müller, Harry, 2014. "Arbeitsgruppen und ihre Bestimmungsgründe: Eine empirische Untersuchung im deutschen Maschinenbau," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 9/2014, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:92014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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