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Theoretische Erklärungsansätze für die Entsprechenserklärungen zu Abfindungen für Vorstandsmitglieder
[Theoretical explanation approaches for the declarations of conformity regarding severance payments for members of the management board]

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  • Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag werden theoretische Erklärungen gesucht für die dauerhaft hohe Abweichungsquote der Entsprechenserklärungen hinsichtlich Vorstandsabfindungen von über 20 % von Empfehlung Ziffer 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und für die Unabhängigkeit der Abweichungsquote von der Zugehörigkeit des Unternehmens zum Prime Standard und von der Zugehörigkeit des Unternehmens zu einem der Auswahlindices DAX, MDAX, TecDAX oder SDAX. Auch die mehrheitliche Überschreitung der Obergrenze trotz Entsprechenserklärungen und das Unterlassen der Erwähnung der Überschreitung im vergangenheitsorientierten Teil der folgenden Erklärung sollen erklärt werden. Aus verschiedenen theoretischen Modellen werden jeweils Veränderungsempfehlungen für die Regelung der Abfindungsobergrenzen für Vorstandsmitglieder abgeleitet.

Suggested Citation

  • Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute, 2017. "Theoretische Erklärungsansätze für die Entsprechenserklärungen zu Abfindungen für Vorstandsmitglieder [Theoretical explanation approaches for the declarations of conformity regarding severance paym," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 7/2017, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:72017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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