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EC trade protection law: Produmping or antidumping?

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  • Schuknecht, Ludger
  • Stephan, Joerg

Abstract

This paper argues that the anticipation of protection can have a stimulating effect on exports instead of the commonly claimed effect of harassment. If protection serves market cartellization by fixing export quantities or prices, exporters may have an incentive to increase their sales abroad in order to secure a large share of the expected rent, which is brought about by the anticipated import restriction. This may even result in sales below marginal costs or dumping. The effect of the rotectionist threat may then be the reverse of what is intended: it can raise the speed of import penetration and it can provoke dumping. A formal model and a supportive institutional analysis of EC trade protection is supplemented by preliminary empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Schuknecht, Ludger & Stephan, Joerg, 1992. "EC trade protection law: Produmping or antidumping?," Discussion Papers, Series II 174, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:174
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    1. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 113-129, Springer.
    2. L. Alan Winters, 1994. "Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy, pages 211-234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Klaus Stegemann, 1991. "The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 375-405, December.
    4. Michel Kostecki, 1987. "Export-restraint Arrangements and Trade Liberalization," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 425-453, December.
    5. Michael P. Leidy & Bernard M. Hoekman, 1991. "Spurious Injury As Indirect Rent Seeking: Free Trade Under The Prospect Of Protection," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 111-137, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.

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