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Corruption and Trade in General Equilibrium

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  • Sugata Marjit
  • Biswajit Mandal

Abstract

We use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, not just its effect on the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant countries will restrict the volume of world trade while corrupt capital-abundant countries promote trade. This is caused by intermediaries who are engaged in mitigating the transaction cost of corruption. Relatively corrupt economy will export capital-intensive goods. However, relatively capital-abundant country will be worse off with increasing degree of corruption at home and abroad, whereas the labor-abundant country may gain from further corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Sugata Marjit & Biswajit Mandal, 2008. "Corruption and Trade in General Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 08/15, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    • Handle: RePEc:not:notgep:08/15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pi, Jiancai & Zhou, Yu, 2013. "Institutional quality and skilled–unskilled wage inequality," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 356-363.
    2. Mandal, Biswajit & Marjit, Sugata, 2010. "Corruption and wage inequality?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 166-172, January.
    3. Mandal, Biswajit, 2009. "Would Recession Induce More Intermediation in the Corrupt Informal Sector?," MPRA Paper 19930, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jan 2010.

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