Protection, lobbying, and market structure
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- Long, N.V. & Soubeyran, A. & Hillman, A., 1998. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a24, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-12, CIRANO.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Naylor, Robin & Soegaard, Christian, 2018.
"The Effects of Entry in Oligopolistic Trade with Bargained Input Prices,"
Economic Research Papers
269084, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Naylor, Robin & Soegaard, Christian, 2018. "The Effects of Entry in Oligopolistic Trade with Bargained Input Prices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1148, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Wilfred J. Ethier & Arye L. Hillman, 2017. "The Politics of International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 6456, CESifo.
- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Eun‐Soo Park & Howard J. Wall, 2004.
"Endogenous Export Subsidies And Welfare Under Domestic Cost Heterogeneity,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 347-366, November.
- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Eun-Soo Park & Howard J. Wall, 1999. "Endogenous export subsidies and welfare under domestic cost heterogeneity," Working Papers 1999-017, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Tavares, Samia, 2006. "Deeper Integration and Voting on the Common European External Tariff," MPRA Paper 960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
- Andrew Dick, 1995. "Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating (Forthcoming in Review of International Economics)," UCLA Economics Working Papers 730, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
- Koziashvili, Arkadi & Nitzan, Shmuel & Tobol, Yossef, 2010. "Bureaucracy Norms and Market Size," Economics Series 259, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Larry D. Qiu, 2008. "Endogenous Lobbying Positions," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 641-653, September.
- Tavares, Samia, 2006. "The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests," MPRA Paper 959, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chia Chiun Ko & Paul Frijters & Gigi Foster, 2018. "A Tale of Cyclones, Exports and Surplus Forgone in Australia's Protected Banana Industry," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 94(306), pages 276-300, September.
- Lasserre, Pierre & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2003.
"A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 29-45, January.
- Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "A Ricardian Model of the tragedy of the Commons," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-01, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-14, CIRANO.
- Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012.
"Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
- Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2009. "Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?," NBER Working Papers 14771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robin Naylor & Christian Soegaard, 2022. "Profit‐raising entry under oligopolistic trade with endogenous input prices," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 2135-2164, July.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "A Theory of Favoritism under International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-15, CIRANO.
- Huilan Tian, 2003. "Eco‐labelling scheme, environmental protection, and protectionism," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(3), pages 608-633, August.
- Samia Tavares, 2006. "The political economy of the European customs classification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 107-130, October.
- kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Saha, Amrita, 2019.
"Trade policy & lobbying effectiveness: Theory and evidence for India,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 165-192.
- Amrita Saha, 2017. "Trade Policy & Lobbying Effectiveness: Theory and Evidence for India," Working Paper Series 0417, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
- Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
- Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2007.
"Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 9-29, March.
- Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2002. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-35, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U. S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers 0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank.
- Catola, Marco & D'Alessandro, Simone, 2020. "Market competition, lobbying influence and environmental externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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