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Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games

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  • Doll, Monika
  • Seebauer, Michael
  • Tonn, Maren

Abstract

We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding gain and loss framing, we do not find differences in proposers' behavior. Responders show less willingness to wait when the bargaining outcome is framed as a loss compared to being framed as a gain of time. Displaying less willingness to wait, responders show a higher propensity to risk a rejection of the proposers' offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Doll, Monika & Seebauer, Michael & Tonn, Maren, 2017. "Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 15/2017, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:152017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ultimatum Game; Waiting Time; Experimental Currency; Leaving the Laboratory; Framing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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