IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/csledp/200405.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Störung der Vertragsparität

Author

Listed:
  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag behandelt Begriff, Ursachen, Wirkungen sowie Bewertung und mögliche Ausgleichsmaßnahmen gestörter Vertragsparität. Dabei wird auf die ökonomische Verhandlungstheorie und die Theorie der Wettbewerbsmärkte zurückgegriffen. Es werden in der Rechtswissenschaft vorfindbare Definitionen in die ökonomische Sprache übersetzt und ihre logische Konsistenz überprüft. Unter normativen Gesichtspunkten werden Begründungen für einen rechtspolitischen Handlungsbedarf im Falle gestörter Vertragsparität untersucht. Abschließend werden zwei Klassen von Möglichkeiten zum Ausgleich gestörter Vertragsparität erörtert: Vertragsregulierung und Ordnungspolitik.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2004. "Störung der Vertragsparität," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200405
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23046/1/2004-05_vertragspar.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Koboldt, Christian & Kirstein, Roland, 1997. "Rechtsvereinheitlichung beim "droit de suite"? Ökonomische Analyse des Richtlinienentwurfs der Europäischen Kommission," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 97-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Schmidtchen, Dieter & Kirstein, Roland, 2001. "Die EU-Richtlinie zum Folgerecht. Eine ökonomische Gesetzesfolgenanalyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Rasmusen, Eric & Ayres, Ian, 1993. "Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 309-343, June.
    4. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Contract Law," NBER Working Papers 9696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Oberender Peter & Zerth Jürgen, 2006. "Soziale Ziele und marktwirtschaftliches Gesundheitswesen - schlußendlich kein Gegensatz! Anmerkungen zum Spannungsfeld von Wettbewerbspolitik und Sozialrecht / Social claims and liberal health care re," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 57(1), pages 261-284, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roland Kirstein, "undated". "Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1082, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    2. Anne Corcos & Yorgos Rizopoulos, 2011. "Is prosocial behavior egocentric? The “invisible hand” of emotions," Post-Print halshs-01968213, HAL.
    3. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
    4. van der Heijden, Eline & Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin, 2009. "Hierarchy and opportunism in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 39-50, January.
    5. Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    6. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    7. Ley, Eduardo, 2006. "Statistical inference as a bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 142-149, October.
    8. Pelligra, Vittorio, 2010. "Trust responsiveness. On the dynamics of fiduciary interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 653-660, December.
    9. Pursey Heugens & J. Oosterhout & Muel Kaptein, 2006. "Foundations and Applications for Contractualist Business Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 211-228, October.
    10. Hendrik Vollmer, 2013. "What kind of game is everyday interaction?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(3), pages 370-404, August.
    11. Sheri M. Markose, 2005. "Computability and Evolutionary Complexity: Markets as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(504), pages 159-192, 06.
    12. Laurie Bréban & Muriel Gilardone, 2019. "A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s account of Public Reasoning: the Man Within for the Man Without," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2019-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    13. Gerald Schneider & Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game‐Theoretic Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 85-103, February.
    14. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers 084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers 075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Vittorio Pelligra, 2011. "Intentions, Trust and Frames: A Note on Sociality and the Theory of Games," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 69(2), pages 163-188.
    18. Hang Ye & Fei Tan & Mei Ding & Yongmin Jia & Yefeng Chen, 2011. "Sympathy and Punishment: Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Game," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 14(4), pages 1-20.
    19. Richard B. Howarth & Matthew A. Wilson, 2006. "A Theoretical Approach to Deliberative Valuation: Aggregation by Mutual Consent," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-16.
    20. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Synallagma; Pareto-Effizienz; Rationalität; Wettbewerb; Verhandlungen; freedom of contract; unfair contracts; procedural unfairness; substantive unfairness; equality of exchange; bargaining power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fosaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.