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Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games

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  • V. Pelligra

Abstract

Psychological Game Theory (PGT) extends classical game theory allowing for the formal analysis of belief-dependent sentiments and emotions such as resentment, pride, shame, gratefulness, and the like. PGT incorporates these factors by relating agents subjective expected utility to players strategies, to their beliefs about others strategies, but also to their beliefs about others beliefs about their strategies, and so on. This paper argues that, thanks to the epistemic consequences of this hierarchy of beliefs, PGT is well-endowed to address, and to some extent solve three of the most challenging problems recently emerged in classical game theory, namely, the problem of intentions, that of trust and that of decision frames.

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  • V. Pelligra, 2007. "Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games," Working Paper CRENoS 200702, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    • Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Michael Bacharach, 2006. "The Hi-Lo Paradox, from Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory," Introductory Chapters, in: Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden (ed.),Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elsner, Wolfram & Schwardt, Henning, 2012. "Trust and Arena Size. Expectations, Trust, and Institutions Co-Evolving, and Their Critical Population and Group Sizes," MPRA Paper 40393, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Pelligra, Vittorio, 2010. "Trust responsiveness. On the dynamics of fiduciary interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 653-660, December.
    3. De Rosa, Dalila & Semplici, Lorenzo, 2016. "Prospettive di domanda ed offerta di benessere multidimensionale," AICCON Working Papers 147-2016, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    4. Gräbner, Claudius, 2015. "Formal Approaches to Socio Economic Policy Analysis - Past and Perspectives," MPRA Paper 61348, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Gräbner, Claudius, 2016. "Agent-based computational models– a formal heuristic for institutionalist pattern modelling?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 241-261, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trust; psychological games; intentions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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