IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/yon/wpaper/2020rwp-175.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution

Author

Listed:
  • Jin Yeub Kim

    (Yonsei Univ)

Abstract

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported as sequential equilibria. Further, standard refinement concepts and selection criteria do not restrict the large set of interim Pareto-undominated sequential equilibria. I provide a noncooperative foundation of the neutral bargaining solution by characterizing the solution as a unique coherent equilibrium allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin Yeub Kim, 2020. "A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution," Working papers 2020rwp-175, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:yon:wpaper:2020rwp-175
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://121.254.254.220/repec/yon/wpaper/2020rwp-175.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    2. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
    3. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-487, March.
    4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    2. Okada, Akira, 2016. "A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 318-341.
    3. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017. "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 645-665.
    4. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November.
    5. Takeshi Nishimura, 2019. "Informed Principal Problems in Bilateral Trading," Papers 1906.10311, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    6. Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "An efficient solution to the informed principal problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 114-133, July.
    7. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Troger, Thomas E., 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    9. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2004. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 799-813, November.
    10. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1522-1554, May.
    11. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    12. Matthews, Steven A, 1995. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 567-589, May.
    13. Theodoros M. Diasakos & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2011. "Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 215, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    14. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
    15. Jin Yeub Kim, 2020. "Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems," Working papers 2020rwp-174, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    16. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-1575, September.
    17. Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
    18. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-75, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Neutral bargaining solution; mechanism-selection game; equilibrium refinement; equilibrium selection criterion; credibility; coherent plan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yon:wpaper:2020rwp-175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: YERI (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eryonkr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.