A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.002
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- OKADA, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types," Discussion Papers 2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Akira Okada, 2015.
"Cooperation and Institution in Games,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," Discussion Papers 2014-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022.
"Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1522-1554, May.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2020. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2020-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Akira Okada, 2018. "Incomplete Contract and Verifiability," KIER Working Papers 982, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Kristal K. Trejo & Ruben Juarez & Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2023. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining with Unsophisticated Agents," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 937-974, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bayesian bargaining problem; Incomplete information; Mechanism selection; Ex post Nash bargaining solution; Non-cooperative games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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