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The Incentives to Form Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence

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  • Lars-Hendrik Röller
  • Mihkel M. Tombak
  • Ralph Siebert

Abstract

The literature on research joint ventures (RJVs) has emphasized internalizing spillovers and cost-sharing as motives for RJV formation. In this paper we develop two additional explanations: product market complementarities and firm heterogeneity. We analyze a model of RJVs with asymmetric firms and differentiated products. We then test these various explanations for RJV formation by estimating an endogenous switching model using data now available through the U. S. National Cooperative Research Act. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Anreize, ein Forschungs-Joint Venture zu gründen) Die Literatur über Forschungs-Joint-Ventures (FJV) hat bisher die Internalisierung von Spillovers und die Kostenaufteilung als primäre Motive, ein FJV zu gründen, hervorgebracht. In diesem Beitrag werden zwei weitere Gründe angeführt: Produktmarktkomplementaritäten und Unternehmensheterogenitäten. Wir analysieren ein Modell über FJV mit asymmetrischen Unternehmen und differenzierten Produkten. Anschließend testen wir die verschiedenen Erklärungen, ein FJV zu gründen. Hierbei wird ein endogenes "switching" Modell geschätzt, in dem Daten von "U.S. National Cooperative Research Act" benutzt werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars-Hendrik Röller & Mihkel M. Tombak & Ralph Siebert, 1998. "The Incentives to Form Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv98-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    2. Peter Huber & Daniela Kletzan-Slamanig, 2000. "Bestimmungsfaktoren der Integration von Unternehmen in internationale Netzwerke," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 19531, April.
    3. Krogmann, Yin & Riedel, Nadine & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2013. "Inter-firm R&D networks in pharmaceutical biotechnology: What determines firm's centrality-based partnering capability," FZID Discussion Papers 75-2013, University of Hohenheim, Center for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID).
    4. Kaiser, Ulrich, 2001. "A simple game-theoretical framework for studying R&D expenditures and R&D cooperation," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-22, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Manuela Gussoni, 2009. "The determinants of inter-firms R&D cooperation and partner selection. A literature overview," Discussion Papers 2009/86, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    6. Siotis, Georges & Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis, 2002. "Public Policies Towards Research Joint Venture Formation: Designs and Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 3772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Nakajima, Ryo & Ogura, Yoshiaki, 2010. "The dynamics of R&D network in the IT industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 386-399, April.
    8. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    9. Tatiana Alonso & Pedro Marín, 2004. "Research joint ventures: the role of public research institutes," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(2), pages 213-231, May.
    10. Mari­n, Pedro L. & Siotis, Georges, 2008. "Public policies towards Research Joint Venture: Institutional design and participants' characteristics," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(6-7), pages 1057-1065, July.
    11. Kaiser, Ulrich, 2002. "An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the German service sector," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 747-774, June.

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