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Bargaining with commitments

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  • Juan Vidal-Puga

    (University of Vigo)

Abstract

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the selective marginal contributions vectors determine the core when it is nonempty.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0306002
    Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 ; figures: none
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
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    9. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
    10. Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
    11. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-851, November.
    12. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-387, March.
    13. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 255-273, March.
    14. (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189.
    15. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiawei Li & Tianxiang Cui & Graham Kendall, 2022. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(15), pages 1-9, July.
    2. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
    3. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2013. "Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 127-140.
    4. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2020. "Cooperative games for minimum cost spanning tree problems," MPRA Paper 104911, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 65-99, June.
    6. , & ,, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    7. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2012. "A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting," Discussion Papers 2012-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    8. Breitmoser, Yves, 2011. "Binomial menu auctions in government formation," MPRA Paper 28576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2020. "Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 8-14.
    10. Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2017. "On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 425-452.
    11. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2006. "Efficient bidding with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 304-320, November.
    12. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    13. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    14. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Min-Hung Tsay & Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2020. "A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1045-1057, December.
    15. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June.
    16. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007. "Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
    17. Bahel, Eric, 2021. "Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    18. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2021. "A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 73-100, March.
    19. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya, 2013. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1309, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    20. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2011. "Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives," MPRA Paper 33613, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    demand commitment game bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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