Bargaining and Value
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- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
References listed on IDEAS
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