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How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

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  • Jennifer Hunt

Abstract

Using cross???country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non???victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims??? demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims??? propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennifer Hunt, 2006. "How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp836, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-836
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    File URL: http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/57216/1/wp836.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hunt, Jennifer, 2004. "Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link With Crime," CEPR Discussion Papers 4567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    3. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2006. "Does corruption produce unsafe drivers?," Natural Field Experiments 00218, The Field Experiments Website.
    4. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4394 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. repec:lic:licosd:12402 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2005. "Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 171-191, January.
    9. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    10. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    11. Xavier, Ana & Robin Thompson, 2003. "Unofficial payments for acute state hospital care in Kazakhstan. A model of physician behaviour with price discrimination and vertical service differentiation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 224, Royal Economic Society.
    12. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; bribery; governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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