IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/4512.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Does participation in productive associations signal trust and creditworthiness ? evidence for Nicaragua

Author

Listed:
  • Angel-Urdinola, Diego F.
  • Molina, Ezequiel

Abstract

This article studies the extent to which participation in productive associations in Nicaragua contributes to increase individuals'access to social programs and credit services. By participating in productive associations, individuals give a good signal to firms and are rewarded with better transactions and more access to the services they provide, ceteris paribus. Estimates using 2005 data indicate that households that participate in productive associations display higher access to credit and to social programs that promote investment. Additionally, participation in productive associations is weakly associated to more favorable credit outcomes among those households that receive loans, such as lower interest rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit than what was accessible to them.

Suggested Citation

  • Angel-Urdinola, Diego F. & Molina, Ezequiel, 2008. "Does participation in productive associations signal trust and creditworthiness ? evidence for Nicaragua," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4512, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4512
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/02/07/000158349_20080207140758/Rendered/PDF/wps4512.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    2. Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, 2008. "On the Failure of the Bootstrap for Matching Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1537-1557, November.
    3. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
    2. Thomas de Haan & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2015. "Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation Of Cheap Talk And Burned Money," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1385-1426, November.
    3. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
    4. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    5. Theodore Koutmeridis, 2013. "The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality," CDMA Working Paper Series 201307, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, revised 14 Oct 2013.
    6. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    7. Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994. "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers 9409, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    8. Fuhai Hong & Dong Zhang, 2023. "Bureaucratic beliefs and law enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 357-379, September.
    9. Moisson, Paul-Henri, 2024. "Meritocracy and Inequality," TSE Working Papers 24-1518, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2024.
    10. Daniel Gottlieb & Kent Smetters, 2011. "Grade Non-Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 17465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
    12. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    13. Munoz-Garcia Felix & Espinola-Arredondo Ana, 2011. "The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-20, March.
    14. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    15. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2021. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    16. Tsao, Hsiu-Yuan & Pitt, Leyland F. & Berthon, Pierre, 2006. "An experimental study of brand signal quality of products in an asymmetric information environment," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 397-405, August.
    17. Majumdar, Mukul & Yoo, Seung Han, 2011. "Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling," Working Papers 11-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
    18. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    19. Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2010. "Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 199-223, April.
    20. Adriani, Fabrizio & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2019. "A theory of esteem based peer pressure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 314-335.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Access to Finance; Corporate Law; Labor Policies; Debt Markets;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4512. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.