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Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

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  • Harry de Gorter

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  • Harry de Gorter, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," World Bank Publications - Reports 28275, The World Bank Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wboper:28275
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